

# Decomposing Software Verification into Off-the-Shelf Components

## An Application to CEGAR


**Thomas Lemberger**

with Dirk Beyer, Jan Haltermann, and Heike Wehrheim



2022-04-03 COOP Workshop. Original slides by Jan Haltermann.


# Motivation: Classic CEGAR



# Motivation: Classic CEGAR - Issues

## Issues:

- ▶ Many tools employ flavors of CEGAR (stateful)
- ▶ Common underlying schema
- ▶ New idea ⇒ New implementation



# Motivation: Classic CEGAR - Issues

```
1 int main() {  
2     unsigned int y = 1;  
3     while (1) {  
4         y = y + 2U * nondet();  
5         if (y != 0) {}  
6         else  
7             error();  
8     }  
9 }
```

```
1 int main(void) {  
2     unsigned int x = 0;  
3     unsigned short N = nondet();  
4     while (x < N) {  
5         x += 2;  
6     }  
7     if (x % 2 == 0) {}  
8     else  
9         error();  
10 }
```


Craig interpolation:  
 $(y \bmod 2 = 1)$

Newton refinement:  
 $1 \leq y + 2 * \lfloor ((y * -1 + 1) / 2) \rfloor$


Craig interpolation:  
*no solution*

Newton refinement:  
 $x \leq 2 * (x / 2)$


# Decomposing CEGAR




# Decomposing CEGAR




# Decomposing CEGAR



# Decomposing CEGAR



# Component-based CEGAR (C-CEGAR)



# Exchange Formats for C-CEGAR

Violation  
Witness


Abstract description of counterexample in  
GraphML/XML

# Exchange Formats for C-CEGAR



Violation  
Witness


Abstract description of counterexample in  
GraphML/XML



Path  
Witness


Rejected violation witness

# Exchange Formats for C-CEGAR




Violation  
Witness

Abstract description of counterexample in  
GraphML/XML



Path  
Witness

Rejected violation witness



Invariant  
Witness


Candidate invariants to help correctness proof in GraphML/XML

# Exchange Formats for C-CEGAR




Violation  
Witness

Abstract description of counterexample in  
GraphML/XML



Path  
Witness

Rejected violation witness




Invariant  
Witness


Candidate invariants to help correctness proof in GraphML/XML

Formats required by SV-COMP  $\Rightarrow$  good tool support

# Component-based CEGAR (C-CEGAR)




# Use of Off-the-Shelf Components: Model Explorer




Idea of METAVAL (Beyer, Spiessl, CAV 2020)

# Use of Off-the-Shelf Components: Feasibility Checker




Idea of METAVAL (Beyer, Spiessl, CAV 2020)

# Use of Off-the-Shelf Components: Precision Refiner



# Implementation



# Evaluation

Research Questions:

- ▶ RQ1: Overhead of a component-based approach
- ▶ RQ2: Cost using existing formats
- ▶ RQ3: Use of off-the-shelf components


Dataset: SV-BENCHMARKS (8 347 tasks), SV-COMP setting

## RQ1: Overhead of component based design

- ▶ Pred: CPAchecker's predicate abstraction
- ▶ C-Pred: C-CEGAR with CPAchecker as each component
- ▶ Proprietary precision exchange format

	correct			incorrect	
	overall	proof	alarm	proof	alarm
Pred	3769	2 556	1 213	3	9
C-Pred	3524	2 450	1 074	0	3

## RQ1: Overhead of component based design



Run time of  
Pred and C-Pred, per task


Median factor of run-time  
increase by C-Pred,  
compared to Pred.  
Overall median increase is 3.2

## RQ2: Cost of Standardized Formats

- ▶ C-PredWit: C-Pred, but use violation witnesses **and** invariant witnesses

	correct		
	overall	proof	alarm
<b>C-Pred</b>	3524	2 450	1 074
<b>C-PredWit</b>	2854	2 110	744

- ▶ Effectiveness reduces by 20%
- ▶ Reasons:
  - ▶ Not all discovered predicates are exported as invariants
  - ▶ No loop unrollings in witness



Run time of C-Pred  
and C-PredWit

## RQ3: C-CEGAR using different components

**RQ 3.1: C-PredWit + different feasibility checker** (precision refiner: CPACHECKER)

	overall	correct			
		proof	unique	alarm	unique
<b>CPACHECKER</b>	1 573	978	61	595	317
<b>F\$HELL-WITNESS2TEST</b>	612	515	0	97	56
<b>UAUTOMIZER</b>	1 225	918	1	307	20


## RQ3: C-CEGAR using different components

### RQ 3.2: C-PredWit + different precision refiner (feasibility checker: CPACHECKER)

	correct				
	overall	proof	unique	alarm	unique
<b>CPACHECKER</b>	1573	978	301	595	303
<b>UAUTOMIZER</b>	1016	716	41	300	6

# Summary

- ▶ C-CEGAR breaks tightly coupled CEGAR into smaller, stand-alone components
- ▶ C-CEGAR clearly defines interfaces
- ▶ Flexible compositions in [CoVERITeam](#)
- ▶ Evaluation shows:
  - ▶ Similar effectiveness as tightly coupled CEGAR
  - ▶ Different techniques improve effectiveness
- ⇒ Decompositions possible **and worth it**



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