

Configurable Software Model Checking CPACHECKER

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Software Verification

C Program

```
int main() {  
    int a = foo();  
    int b = bar(a);  
  
    assert(a == b);  
}
```



Verification
Tool



TRUE


i.e., specification
is satisfied



FALSE

i.e., bug found

General method:
Create an overapproximation
of the program states /
compute program invariants



CPAchecker History

- ▶ 2002: BLAST with lazy abstraction refinement
- ▶ 2003: Multi-threading support
- ▶ 2004: Test-case generation, interpolation, spec. lang.
- ▶ 2005: Memory safety, predicated lattices
- ▶ 2006: Lazy shape analysis
- ▶ Maintenance and extensions became extremely difficult because of design choices that were not easy to revert
- ▶ 2007: Configurable program analysis, CPAchecker was started as complete reimplemention from scratch


CPAchecker History (2)

- ▶ 2009: Large-block encoding
- ▶ 2010: Adjustable-block encoding
- ▶ 2012: Conditional model checking, PredAbs vs. Impact
- ▶ 2013: Explicit-state MC, BDDs, precision reuse
- ▶ ...

Software Verification by Model Checking

[Clarke/Emerson, Sifakis 1981]


Iterative fixpoint (forward) post computation



Software Verification by Model Checking

[Clarke/Emerson, Sifakis 1981]


Iterative fixpoint (forward) post computation



Software Verification by Model Checking

[Clarke/Emerson, Sifakis 1981]


Iterative fixpoint (forward) post computation



Software Verification by Model Checking

[Clarke/Emerson, Sifakis 1981]

Iterative fixpoint (forward) post computation



Software Model Checking

Reached, Frontier := { e_0 }

while *Frontier* $\neq \emptyset$ **do**

 remove e from *Frontier*

for all $e' \in \underline{\text{post}}(e)$ **do**


if $\neg \underline{\text{stop}}(e', \textit{Reached})$ **then**

 add e' to *Reached, Frontier*

return *Reached*


Software Verification by Data-Flow Analysis

Fixpoint computation on the CFG




Software Verification by Data-Flow Analysis

Fixpoint computation on the CFG




Software Verification by Data-Flow Analysis

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
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
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
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
Software Verification by Data-Flow Analysis

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
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Software Verification by Data-Flow Analysis

Fixpoint computation on the CFG



Software Model Checking

Reached, Frontier := { e_0 }

while *Frontier* $\neq \emptyset$ **do**

 remove e from *Frontier*

for all $e' \in \underline{\text{post}}(e)$ **do**

if $\neg \underline{\text{stop}}(e', \textit{Reached})$ **then**

 add e' to *Reached, Frontier*


return *Reached*

Configurable Program Analysis

```
Reached, Frontier := { $e_0$ }  
while Frontier  $\neq \emptyset$  do  
  remove  $e$  from Frontier  
  for all  $e' \in \underline{\text{post}}(e)$  do  
    for all  $e'' \in \textit{Reached}$  do  
       $e''_{\text{new}} := \underline{\text{merge}}(e', e'')$   
      if  $e''_{\text{new}} \neq e''$  then  
        replace  $e''$  in Reached, Frontier by  $e''_{\text{new}}$   
      if  $\neg \underline{\text{stop}}(e', \textit{Reached})$  then  
        add  $e'$  to Reached, Frontier  
return Reached
```

Configurable Program Analysis

- ▶ Better combination of abstractions
→ Configurable Program Analysis [Beyer/Henzinger/Theoduloz CAV'07]



Unified framework that enables intermediate algorithms

Dynamic Precision Adjustment

Lazy abstraction refinement: [\[Henzinger/Jhala/Majumdar/Sutre POPL'02\]](#)

- ▶ Different predicates per location and per path
- ▶ Incremental analysis instead of restart from scratch after refinement

Dynamic Precision Adjustment


Better fine tuning of the precision of abstractions

→ Adjustable Precision

[Beyer/Henzinger/Theoduloz ASE'08]

Unified framework enables:

- ▶ switch on and off different analysis, and can
 - ▶ adjust each analysis separately
- Not only **refine**, also **abstract**!




Adjustable Block-Encoding

- ▶ Handle loop-free blocks of statements at once
- ▶ Abstract only between blocks
(less abstractions, less refinements)


[Beyer/Cimatti/Griggio/Keremoglu/Sebastiani FMCAD'09]

[Beyer/Keremoglu/Wendler FMCAD'10]



CPACHECKER

[Beyer/Keremoglu CAV'11]



CPA – Summary

- ▶ Unification of several approaches
→ reduced to their essential properties
- ▶ Allow experimentation with new configurations that we could never think of
- ▶ Flexible implementation `CPACHECKER`

- ▶ Framework for Software Verification — current status
 - ▶ Written in Java
 - ▶ Open Source: Apache 2.0 License
 - ▶ ~80 contributors so far from 15 universities/institutions
 - ▶ 430.000 lines of code
(275.000 without blank lines and comments)
 - ▶ Started 2007

<https://cpachecker.sosy-lab.org>



CPACHECKER: Features

- ▶ Input language C (experimental: Java)
- ▶ Web frontend available:
<https://cpachecker.appspot.com>
- ▶ Counterexample output with graphs
- ▶ Benchmarking infrastructure available
(with large cluster of machines)
- ▶ Cross-platform: Linux, Mac, Windows


- ▶ Among world's best software verifiers:
<https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2018/results/>
- ▶ Continuous success in competition since 2012
(52 medals: 16x gold, 18x silver, 18x bronze)
- ▶ Awarded Gödel medal
by Kurt Gödel Society
- ▶ Used for Linux driver verification
with dozens of real bugs found and fixed in Linux



- ▶ Included Concepts:
 - ▶ CEGAR
 - ▶ Interpolation
 - ▶ Adjustable-block encoding
 - ▶ Conditional model checking
 - ▶ Verification witnesses
- ▶ Further available analyses:
 - ▶ *IMPACT* algorithm
 - ▶ Bounded model checking
 - ▶ k-Induction
 - ▶ Property-directed reachability

- ▶ Completely modular, and thus flexible and easily extensible
- ▶ Every abstract domain is implemented as a "Configurable Program Analysis" (CPA)
- ▶ E.g., predicate abstraction, explicit-value analysis, intervals, octagon, BDDs, memory graphs, and more
- ▶ Algorithms are central and implemented only once
- ▶ Separation of concerns
- ▶ Combined with Composite pattern

- ▶ CPAAlgorithm is the core algorithm for reachability analysis / fixpoint iteration
- ▶ Other algorithms can be added if desired, e.g.,
 - ▶ CEGAR
 - ▶ Double-checking counterexamples
 - ▶ Sequential combination of analyses





Try CPACHECKER

- ▶ Online at Google AppEngine:
<https://cpachecker.appspot.com/>
- ▶ Download for Linux/Windows:
<https://cpachecker.sosy-lab.org>
 - ▶ Run `scripts/cpa.sh` | `scripts\cpa.bat`
 - ▶ `-predicateAnalysis <FILE>`
 - ▶ Windows/Mac need to disable bitprecise analysis:
`-predicateAnalysis-linear`
`-setprop solver.solver=smtinterpol`
`-setprop analysis.checkCounterexamples=false`
- ▶ Look at `output/CPALog.txt` for problems
- ▶ Open `.dot` files with `dotty` / `xdot` (www.graphviz.org/)
- ▶ Open graphical report in browser: `output/*.html`

- ▶ Model Checkers check only what you specified
- ▶ CPACHECKER's default:
 - ▶ Label `ERROR`
 - ▶ Calling function `_assert_fail()`
 - ▶ `assert(pred)` needs to be pre-processed
- ▶ SV-COMP:
 - ▶ Calling function `_VERIFIER_error()`
 - ▶ `-spec sv-comp-reachability`

Want to implement your own analysis?

- ▶ Easy, just write a CPA in Java
- ▶ Implementations for 10 interfaces needed
- ▶ But for 8, we have default implementations
 - Minimal configuration:
abstract state and
abstract post operator

The CPA framework is flexible:

- ▶ Many components are provided as CPAs:
 - ▶ Location / program counter tracking
 - ▶ Callstack tracking
 - ▶ Specification input (as automata)
 - ▶ Pointer-aliasing information
- ▶ CPAs can be combined,
so your analysis doesn't need to care about these things